About 2 years ago (still can't believe it's already been that long), while in Afghanistan, a friend of mine stuck a picture similar to the one below up on our wall.
At the time the ISAF (international Security Assistance Force) commander was General David McKiernan. As we saw it, McKiernan was an ineffective commander. He obviously had no understanding of COIN (Counter-Insurgency) to speak of, spent much of his time kissing you know what, and seemed incapable of instilling confidence in his troops. So we coined the pun "Save us Petraeus" in the blind hope that perhaps the powers that be would see the light and move Petraeus, who was the main force behind the successes that were taking place in Iraq, to our neighborhood as the new commander of ISAF. The picture raised questions from the few who managed to weasel their way into our office and sparked some good conversation and debate. However, the months wore on, Mckiernan stayed, and eventually we were sent home.
Later, at a so-called "redeployment retreat" that was filled with don't kill yourself and don't slap your spouse briefings, my friend pulled me aside and showed me a presentation that had been masterminded by a Stanley McChrystal. I didn't know much about McChrystal at the time except that he had been a spokesperson in the "stuff happens" days of Rumsfeld. I later learned that McChrystal had been "off the radar" because he was conducting "off the radar" operations. Makes sense.
Anyway, I reviewed the presentation and was shocked to see that this general who I knew so little about had viewpoints that closely mirrored my own. (I don't mean to say that my viewpoints are always right, but anybody that knows me also knows that I tend to assume they are) The man advocated a campaign that would consist of scores of small bases in or near Afghan villages that housed NATO and Afghan troops working side by side all the time. It recommended a scaling up of psychological operations (fancy talk for propaganda), a heavier reliance on human intelligence operations (which I really liked for some weird reason), hinted to operations in Pakistan, and focused on a real support of and a genuine transition of responsibility to the Afghan Forces. Odd....this presentation seemed to actually sound like COIN. I loved the presentation and agreed wholeheartedly, but at the time I noted that if this new strategy was implemented, several things would happen. More troops would be needed. More people (including civilians) would die. The time required for any measure of success would be years and years out. And, as a result, I predicted that support for the effort would likely decline.
At or around the same time, I learned that McChrystal would be replacing McKiernan. He was, in my eyes, a second choice to Petraeus for the job. I thought that we finally would make some progress if President Obama, congress, and the general public could understand and support the strategy. To a degree, that's exactly what happened. President Obama at least pretended to stand behind McChrystal, more bad guys were being killed, and some success seemed to be made.
McChrystal has one weakness as a high profile general. He has trouble dealing with politicians and careerists. He's an infantryman and is, therefore, rough around the edges, outspoken, and a bit callous. His request for 40,000 troops was leaked, I believe, in an intentional effort to force Obama to accommodate the request. He hasn't gotten along well with the politicians that force their way into his circle. He obviously doesn't like Biden or Kerry, and I honestly don't believe he enjoyed being around President Obama. (Yeah I know he voted for Obama. But I seem to think that was a career move. Also, I don't think an infantryman like McChrystal would really support "be nicer to POWs" McCain)
His rough demeanor finally caught up to him when Rolling Stone Magazine spotlighted him. McChrystal should have known better than to allow his staff to be that disrespectful. He should have kept his and his staff's lips tight. Now that the story's out, I don't see how Obama, Biden, or any politician can work with him effectively. Therefore, he should go.
In short, I think what McChrystal said was right, but he wasn't right to say it.
Anyway, it appears that my buddy and I are getting our wish. Petraeus has come to save us. And, though I feel that the move from Centcom to ISAF could be considered a step back, I still think Petraeus is the man for the job. He practically wrote the book on COIN, demonstrated its effectiveness in Iraq, is an inspiring leader, and actually knows how to deal with careerists and politicians. He seems to be the ideal blend for the job.
My one fear is that Obama will restrict Petraeus' ability to operate, manipulate the resulting failures, then pull out of Afghanistan prematurely. I fear that he'll say, "I tried McChrystal and Petraeus and they didn't work. What else can I do?", then pull out. I hope I'm wrong.
